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of the proceeding was established. When a plaintiff's attorney left
practice to become a judge and the attorney that succeeded him
had no knowledge that an order to list the matter for the trial had
not been complied with, the court held that under such circumstances
there was good cause for delay. Marquette Appliances, Inc. v.
Wexler, 27 F.R.D. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1960). However, where either
the plaintiff, Jameson v. Du Comb, 275 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1960),
or his attoney, the situation in the principal case, fail to appear
at a court proceeding because of business elsewhere at that time,
such an excuse will be insufficient.
In conclusion it is to be remembered that, while the federal
decisions concerning the rules are not binding upon the courts of
West Virginia, they are valuable guides until the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has established a more definite and
authoritative course to follow.
Lee Ames Luce

ABSTRACTS
Procedure-Importance of Including All Grounds in Motion
for New Trial Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Following a verdict for P in a personal injury suit, a judgment
was entered on April 20. On April 25, D filed a timely motion for
a new trial assigning various grounds, but did not include excessive
verdict. Motion was denied on September 20. On October 18, D
filed a petition for "reargument and reconsideration" of his motion
for a new trial and on the same day, without notice to P or any
hearing, the court entered an order granting a new trial unless P
remit a part of the sum awarded. Held, reversed. The district court
was without power to enter an order granting a new trial on the issue
of damages where such order was not made within ten days after
entry of judgment and where excessiveness of verdict was not
stated as ground in D's motion for a new trial. Demeretz v. Daniels
Motor Freight, Inc., 307 F.2d 469 (3rd Cir. 1962).
The issue in the principal case concerned Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 (d)
which has been incorporated into the new West Virginia rules.
Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any
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reason for which it might have granted a new trial on
motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds
therefor. W. Va. R. C. P. 59(d).
On the federal level the law appears to be settled that even
though a motion for a new trial is made within ten days after a
judgment has been entered, granting of a new trial on grounds not
mentioned in the motion is inferred to be action taken by the court
on its own initative. National Farmers Union Auto. & Cas. Co. v.
Wood, 207 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1953). Furthermore, whether
the court acts directly on its own initiative or whether this initiative
is inferred, the action must take place within the ten day period
following the judgment. Tsai v. Rosenthal, 207 F.2d 614 (8th Cir.
1961).
Prior to the new rules in West Virginia, the court had the
power, on its own initiative to order a new trial where sufficient
grounds existed, but this power was infrequently used. Rule 59(d)
merely places a time limitation on when this discretionary power
may be exercised. LuGAR & SILVERSTEIN, WEST VIRGINIA RULES
454 (1960).
However, if the West Virginia court follows the settled federal
law, the practicing attorney must exercise a greater degree of care
in drafting his motion for a new trial being certain to include all
possible grounds. Then, if the court grants the motion eleven days
following the judgment, based on grounds mentioned within the
motion, Rule 59(d) will have no application. Otherwise, if the
court grants the motion anytime aften ten days following judgment,
on grounds not mentioned in the motion, the court would be acting
on its own initiative and such granting would be void.

Property-Sale of an Undivided Interest in Realty for
Federal Tax Lien
Proceeding by the United States to enforce tax liens against the
one-sixth undivided interest owned by the taxpayer and located in
Alabama. The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Alabama rendered a judgment decreeing public sale of all the
jointly owned property. Held, reversed and remanded. The statute
providing for action to enforce federal tax lien or subject property to
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payment of tax relates to individual property of the delinquent taxpayer and does not authorize the government to force a public sale
on property of other joint owners. Folsom v. United States, 306
F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows the government to
enforce any tax lien under the Code by subjecting to a sale any
property of the delinquent taxpayer, or in which he has any right,
title, or interest. 26 U.S.C. § 7403 (1959). The principal case has
placed a limitation on this broad, sweeping language to the effect
that a federal court must respect the rules of property ownership
in the particular state of the situs of the property sought to be subjected to sale for the tax deficiency.
In West Virginia the applicable rules are comparable to those
in the jurisdiction of the principal case. By statute an owner of an
undivided interest in land, may have this interest separately assessed
on the land books of the county in which the property is located.
Furthermore, in any tax sale only the tract, lot, estate, interest, or
undivided interest proceeded against in that particular instance
shall pass to the purchaser, so that any other estate, interest, or
undivided interest in the same land shall not be affected by the sale.
At such a sale, if the interests have been assessed separately, the
owner of one such interest may purchase the interest of another.
W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 4, § 9 (Michie 1961). Also by statute
tenants in common or joint tenants are entitled to either voluntary
or forced partition. W. VA. CODE ch. 37, art. 4, § 1 (Michie 1961);
50 W. Va. L. Q. 158 (1947).
Where there is a judgment lien involved the controlling principle
appears to be that the lien of a judgment attaches to the interest of
the judgment debtor, nothing more and nothing less. Brown v.
Hodgman, 124 W. Va. 136, 91 S. E. 2d 910 (1942).
In view of the statutes and case law which appear to make
each interest in land separate and distinct, in West Virginia, the
same result should be reached as in the principal case. A federal
tax lien against one of the joint property owners should not subject
the interest of the other owner or owners to a public sale without
at least allowing the non-delinquent holders to obtain partition and
if this be impossible, allow them to purchase the interest of the
delinquent owner.
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Torts-Compensation under Fifth Amendment for Airplane Noise
Ps built their homes adjacent to a military air base. Jet airplane operations from the base caused windows and dishes to rattle,
smoke to blow into the homes during the summer months, and noise
which interrupted ordinary home activities and interfered with the
use and enjoyment of the private homes. Although the aircraft did
not fly directly over Ps' land, they sought to recover under the
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1959), and the Fifth Amendment for private property taken for public use. The United States
District Court for the District of Kansas held for D. Held, affirmed.
Governmental activities which do not directly encroach on private
property are not a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment even though the consequences of such acts may impair the
use of the property. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th
Cir. 1962).
The United States Supreme Court considered the problem
of excessive aviation noise for the first time in United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946). The Court held that continued low-altitude
flights by military aircraft could constitute a "taking" of private
property for which the Fifth Amendment required compensation.
Note, Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, 74
HARv. L. REv. 1581 (1961).
Recently the Court had an opportunity to review its decision in
the Causby case. In Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84
(1962), P's property was in direct line with the landing approach
to the airport. Although the take-offs and landings were within the
navigable air space approved by the F.A.A., the Court allowed recovery under the Fifth Amendment, apparently on the ground that
the approach and departure slopes are a part of the navigable airspace. 30 FoRDHAm L. Rnv. 803 (1962).
The Causby case appears to have been based on the theory of
trespass because the aircraft wandered from the navigable airspace
and thereby directly invaded the plaintiff's property. However, in the
Griggs case there was no direct invasion of the plaintiff's airspace,
but rather a constructive taking of the property because the property
was rendered virtually uninhabitable.
On the other hand, the Ps in the principal case were unable
to show either a trespass or a taking. Their property was made less
enjoyable and no doubt depreciated in value, but it was, neverthe-
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less, still inhabitable. The Ps were put to an unpleasant inconvenience, but such inconvenience did not result in a taking of their
property necessary for them to recover under the Fifth Amendment.

Torts--Malpractice-Statute of Limitations under Federal
Tort Claims Act
P, a veteran, was wounded in Korea and suffered some brain
damage. In 1957 he was examined in a Veterans Administration
Hospital and the injury was diagnosed as psychosomatic. In 1959 he
was admitted to a state hospital and it was discovered that P had an
organic injury to his brain of traumatic origin. P's condition was
treated and he was released. This action against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act was brought in 1960 charging
malpractice by the physicians in the Veterans Hospital. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed
the action on grounds that the two year statute of limitations had
run. Held, reversed and remanded. A claim accrued for the purpose
of the statute of limitations when the claimant discovered, or in
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, acts constituting the alleged malpractice. Hungerford v. United States, 307
F.2d 99 (1962).
The Federal Tort Claims Act was intended to place liability
on the United States in the same manner and to the same extent as
a private individual under like circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 2674
(1959). Actions under the Act are subject to a two year statute of
limitations. Because the various states are in conflict as to the time
a claim accrues, a serious problem is presented the attorney in
determining when the claim of his client may have been barred by
the statute of limitations. Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 369 (1961).
The principal case held that it was not the law of the state
where the injury occurred that determined when the claim accrued,
but rather federal law. This view has not been accepted by all
federal courts. In Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.
1962), the court stated that the state law determines when a cause of
action comes into existence, but the federal law governs the time for
the commencement of the statute of limitations. However, the law
of the state was held to determine when the statute of limitations began
to run in Tessier v. United States, 269 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1959).
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If the principal case had been determined under West Virginia law, a contrary result would have been reached. In the most
recent West Virginia case, an operation was performed in 1946
and an action for malpractice was brought in 1955 for injury sustained
at the time of the operation. The circuit court set aside a verdict for
the plaintiff and granted a new trial. The appellate court affirmed
stating that the cause of action for malpractice accrued at the time
of the operation, when the injury was sustained. Gray v. Wright, 142
W. Va. 490, 96 S.E.2d 671 (1957).
The present problem does not appear to have been considered
by the Fourth Circuit. However, the Fourth Circuit did decide
one of the first cases concerning the Federal Tort Claims Act.
While not actually faced with the determination of when the statute
of limitations began to run, the court set a path followed by the
other circuits in determining that the law of the state must be considered for defining the actionable wrong, but the Federal Tort Claims
Act fixes the limitation of time. Burkhardt v. United States, 165
F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1947).
Assuming that the federal courts serving West Virginia would
accept the rule in the principal case, an action for malpractice under
the Federal Tort Claims Act would be barred by the statute of limitations two years after the injured party discovered or with reasonable
diligence should have discovered the injury, rather than two years
following the actual injury as under West Virginia law.
Robert William Burk, Jr.
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